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Article

Compliance Architecture as Strategy: A Conceptual Framework for Firm Competition Under Fragmented Global Regulation

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Abstract

Global business now unfolds under a regime of fragmented global regulation characterized by overlapping public rules, private standards, extraterritorial enforcement, and increasingly politicized market access. International business scholarship has generated important insights on tech-no-geopolitical uncertainty, nonmarket strategy, institutional complexity, and transnational gov-ernance, yet it still tends to treat compliance as an administrative after-effect rather than as a core strategic capability. This article develops a conceptual framework that reconceptualizes compliance architecture as a firm-level capability through which companies sense regulatory change, translate heterogeneous rules into operating choices, orchestrate cross-border responses, and modularize business models for targeted adaptation. The article makes four contributions. First, it clarifies why regulatory fragmentation moves the unit of strategic analysis beyond isolated legal exposure toward cross-jurisdictional organizational design. Second, it specifies the microfoundations of compliance architecture and explains how they link institutional complexity to competitive outcomes. Third, it offers a typology of four compliance postures: minimalist compliance, localized patchwork, standardized compliance factory, and strategic compliance architecture. Fourth, it advances six propositions and a research agenda for international business policy, nonmarket strategy, and management scholarship. The central argument is that compliance becomes strategically valuable when it is integrated with diplomacy, supply-chain design, and capability development. In a fragmented world economy, firms do not merely survive regulation; they increasingly compete through the quality of the architectures they build to govern it.

Keywords: compliance architecture; international business policy; nonmarket strategy; institutional complexity; regulatory fragmentation; dynamic capabilities

1. Introduction

The contemporary global economy is no longer governed primarily by a relatively coherent liberal logic of market opening and multilateral rule-making. Instead, firms face a progressively denser and less synchronized landscape of export controls, investment screening, sanctions, forced-labor due diligence, carbon border measures, data localization, cybersecurity rules, sustainability disclosure requirements, and private certification regimes. International business is therefore shaped not only by market competition, but by politically contested rule systems that vary across jurisdictions and increasingly travel across borders through extraterritorial enforcement, supply-

chain obligations, and reputational spillovers (Farrell & Newman, 2019; Luo & Van Assche, 2023; Van Assche & De Marchi, 2024).

Recent scholarship has captured important elements of this transition. Work on de-globalization and decoupling explains why firms now operate in a world of contested openness rather than frictionless integration (Witt, 2019; Witt et al., 2023). Recent policy debates also caution against shallow resilience narratives that overlook how governance burdens are actually implemented inside firms and supply chains (Thakur-Weigold & Miroudot, 2024). Research on international business policy clarifies how public authorities shape cross-border business in pursuit of industrial, security, social, and developmental goals (Clegg, 2019; Van Assche & De Marchi, 2024). Studies of techno-geopolitical uncertainty show how interventions in semiconductors, data, and strategic industries reconfigure multinational strategy (Luo & Van Assche, 2023; Teece, 2025). At the same time, scholarship on nonmarket strategy and corporate political activity demonstrates that firms do not merely react to policy environments; they seek to shape them through lobbying, stakeholder engagement, diplomacy, and institutional work (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Lawton et al., 2013; Doh et al., 2022).

Yet one element remains under-theorized: how firms organize internally to operate under fragmented regulation. The compliance function is often treated as an operational necessity, a legal risk screen, or a governance safeguard. In practice, however, compliance decisions now shape market entry, supplier choice, product architecture, digital infrastructure, alliance formation, and the viability of particular business models. Firms increasingly compete not only on price, technology, and brand, but also on their ability to govern regulatory heterogeneity without becoming slow, brittle, or legitimacy-impaired.

This article argues that the missing concept is compliance architecture. Compliance architecture refers to the integrated organizational system through which a firm senses regulatory developments, interprets heterogeneous rules, coordinates responses across units and jurisdictions, verifies conformity, and strategically uses governance choices to preserve market access and adaptive flexibility. Properly understood, compliance architecture is not a narrow legal process. It is a dynamic capability that connects public policy, nonmarket strategy, organizational design, and global value-chain governance.

The article makes four contributions. First, it explains why fragmented global regulation changes the strategic problem faced by firms from one of isolated compliance to one of organizational architecture. Second, it synthesizes five literature streams, international business policy, nonmarket strategy, institutional complexity, transnational governance, and dynamic capabilities, into a unified conceptual account. Third, it proposes a typology that differentiates reactive from strategic compliance postures. Fourth, it develops six propositions and a research agenda for future scholarship on how firms compete, adapt, and shape policy under fragmented regulation.

The policy relevance is direct. Governments increasingly rely on firms to carry out public goals through sanctions screening, supplier due diligence, data controls, export licensing, carbon disclosure, and security-sensitive procurement. Whether these policies work in practice depends in part on whether firms can build organizational systems capable of translating formal obligations into reliable operating routines. The paper therefore treats firm architecture not as an implementation detail, but as a missing link between policy design and policy outcomes.

The paper proceeds in five sections. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and identifies the theoretical gap. Section 3 develops the conceptual framework by linking fragmented global regulation to compliance architecture and its microfoundations. Section 4 presents the typology, propositions, and research agenda. Section 5 discusses managerial and policy implications and concludes.

2. Literature Review and Theoretical Gap

The first relevant literature is international business policy. This stream insists that cross-border business cannot be understood without attention to how public authorities intentionally alter

firm behavior through policy instruments (Boddewyn, 2016; Clegg, 2019; Van Assche & De Marchi, 2024). Recent work extends the field toward industrial policy, sanctions, data governance, public procurement, and geopolitical shocks. The key insight is that firms increasingly operate inside policy-shaped competitive arenas rather than around them. What this literature has not yet fully specified is how firms internalize policy complexity into their operating systems. Policy is usually modeled as an external determinant, but the organizational architectures that translate policy into strategic choice remain less visible.

The second literature concerns nonmarket strategy and corporate political activity. Foundational contributions show that firms pursue integrated market and nonmarket strategies and that political management can be a source of strategic advantage (Baron, 1995; Schuler et al., 2002; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). International business scholars further demonstrate that multinational enterprises face cross-border institutional multiplicity and therefore rely on combinations of corporate political activity, strategic corporate social responsibility, and diplomacy (Doh et al., 2012; Lawton et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2021; Doh et al., 2022). This literature illuminates how firms influence external environments, but it often pays less attention to the internal organizational systems needed to sustain credible, repeatable, and auditable responses across multiple rule systems.

Third, institutional theory explains why organizations struggle when they confront contradictory or overlapping demands from different audiences and governance systems. Institutional complexity arises when firms face multiple normative, regulative, and cognitive logics that cannot be satisfied through a single, straightforward response (Oliver, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2011). For multinational firms, these tensions are amplified by home-country, host-country, and supranational expectations, as well as by the simultaneous salience of public law and private standards. This literature is highly relevant because fragmented regulation is one concrete manifestation of institutional complexity. However, it generally says more about organizational responses than about how those responses become durable, transferable architectures.

Fourth, work on global standards and transnational governance emphasizes that market participation increasingly depends on conformity to public and private rules that are layered rather than unified. Nadvi (2008) shows that standards shape access to global value chains and affect the governance of inter-firm relations. Eberlein et al. (2014) demonstrate that transnational governance schemes interact with one another rather than operating in isolation. Locke et al. (2009) highlight the tension between nominal compliance and deeper commitment in global labor governance. More recent work on data governance extends this line of argument to digital infrastructures and cross-border information flows, showing that firms must deal with rule overlap in use, transfer, storage, and data movement (Coche et al., 2024). The implication is clear: compliance is no longer about matching a single rule to a single organization; it is about navigating interactive governance regimes.

Fifth, the dynamic capabilities literature provides a way to explain how firms repeatedly adapt under uncertainty. Teece (2007) conceptualizes dynamic capabilities as the abilities to sense, seize, and reconfigure. International business scholarship has pushed this view toward turbulent global settings, showing that geopolitical disorder, technological bifurcation, and international disruption require more action-oriented capability development (Zahra et al., 2022; Meyer & Li, 2022; Teece, 2025). This literature offers the strongest basis for moving beyond a static legal conception of compliance. Still, it has rarely focused explicitly on compliance as an architecture through which firms transform policy complexity into strategic action.

Table 1. Literature streams and the gap addressed by this article

Literature stream	Core insight	What it tends to under-specify	How this article extends it
International business policy	Public authorities shape cross-border business through purposeful policy action.	How firms internalize policy complexity into operating systems.	Shows how policy complexity becomes an organizational architecture problem.

Nonmarket strategy and CPA	Firms use political activity, CSR, and diplomacy to shape external environments.	The internal systems required to make these responses consistent across jurisdictions.	Links external engagement to internal compliance design.
Institutional complexity	Organizations face contradictory and overlapping demands from multiple logics.	How responses become durable, transferable, and strategically valuable.	Defines compliance architecture as a durable response configuration.
Global standards and transnational governance	Public and private rules interact to govern market access and value chains.	How firms build internal architectures to navigate interacting rule regimes.	Connects governance interaction to organizational orchestration and evidence systems.
Dynamic capabilities	Competitive advantage under turbulence depends on sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring.	How compliance-related routines become capability microfoundations.	Reconceptualizes compliance as a dynamic capability with strategic outcomes.

Taken together, these literatures explain why the question matters, but not yet what the missing organizational answer looks like. The central gap is that fragmented regulation has been recognized as a condition, while compliance has mostly been treated as a response function. This article instead theorizes compliance architecture as a capability that is constitutive of strategy itself.

That move matters because the adjacent literatures, taken separately, leave a blind spot. Nonmarket strategy explains how firms engage politically, but usually says less about how those external efforts are linked to day-to-day controls. Institutional theory explains why firms face incompatible demands, but often stops at broad response categories such as acquiescence, compromise, or manipulation. Dynamic capabilities explain how firms adapt under turbulence, but rarely specify the compliance-related routines that allow adaptation to happen in auditable ways. The contribution here is to connect those pieces at the level of organizational design. What matters is not just whether the firm lobbies, monitors, or reorganizes, but whether it builds a system that makes those activities mutually reinforcing rather than episodically disconnected.

3. Conceptual Framework: Fragmented Global Regulation and Compliance Architecture

Fragmented global regulation can be defined as the coexistence of multiple, partially overlapping, and unevenly enforced rule systems that affect cross-border business conduct. Fragmentation is not simply the presence of more regulation. It is the presence of regulation that differs by jurisdiction, governance level, enforcement intensity, issue domain, and normative basis. A firm may simultaneously confront export restrictions from one country, due diligence obligations from another, private customer standards, investor expectations, and activist scrutiny that turns technical noncompliance into a legitimacy crisis.

The point is not abstract. Official monitoring by the WTO shows that the stockpile of import-restrictive measures has risen steadily over the last fifteen years. In its November 2024 trade monitoring report, the WTO Secretariat estimated that the cumulative trade coverage of import restrictions in force had increased from USD 118 billion in 2009 to USD 2,942 billion in 2024, equivalent to 11.8% of world imports (WTO, 2024). The same report noted 169 new trade-restrictive measures on goods during the review period from mid-October 2023 to mid-October 2024 and highlighted a continuing stream of export restrictions introduced since 2020. For firms, this means that regulatory friction is no longer episodic. It is part of the operating landscape.

A second sign of structural change is the spread of restrictions into strategic inputs and infrastructure. OECD work on critical raw materials shows that new export restrictions in this area have multiplied since the late 2000s, with a particularly sharp increase after 2020. That matters because restrictions now affect not only final products and customs treatment but also access to upstream materials, energy technologies, batteries, semiconductors, and digital systems. Once regulation reaches those nodes, compliance ceases to be a back-end documentation exercise. It starts shaping supply security, inventory strategy, and the feasibility of global production footprints. More broadly, the structural reshaping of globalization has already pushed firms in strategic sectors toward new

governance choices regarding technology, organization, and cross-border dependence (Petricevic & Teece, 2019).

The third sign is domain expansion. Earlier trade-policy risk was often concentrated in tariffs, quotas, and sector-specific local content rules. The current environment is wider and less tidy. Export controls can be triggered by technological end use, ownership links, or customer identity. Supply-chain due diligence rules demand traceability into lower supplier tiers. Data governance rules govern storage, transfer, localization, and access rights. Carbon and sustainability regulation require auditable metrics that tie products to emissions, sourcing practices, and reporting systems. Firms are therefore not facing one large rulebook. They are facing several partially connected rule systems that ask for different kinds of evidence, operate on different timelines, and are enforced by different audiences.



Figure 1. WTO estimates of the cumulative trade coverage of import-restrictive measures on goods since 2009.

Four features are especially important. The first is jurisdictional multiplicity. Firms now answer at once to home-country, host-country, regional, and supranational rule makers. The second is rule heterogeneity. Some obligations are hard law, some are soft law, and some are private standards that function as de facto law because they determine commercial eligibility. The third is enforcement asymmetry. Certain jurisdictions project their rules extraterritorially or enjoy outsized leverage because access to their markets, technologies, currencies, or platforms is strategically indispensable (Farrell & Newman, 2019; Bradford, 2020). Related work on political risk also suggests that regulatory exposure changes the bargaining position of foreign firms vis-a-vis states, especially when governments can exploit nationality, dependence, or contractual vulnerability (Wellhausen, 2015). The fourth is temporal volatility. Regulatory regimes do not merely differ across space; they shift rapidly over time as geopolitical shocks, elections, conflicts, and technological controversies reshape political priorities (Luo & Van Assche, 2023; Andrews et al., 2026).

These conditions transform the strategic problem faced by firms. Under low fragmentation, compliance can remain a specialized support function because legal obligations are relatively stable, territorially bounded, and separable from business design. Under high fragmentation, however, compliance choices become inseparable from decisions about where to invest, how to source, whether to localize data, how to structure ownership, which products to modularize, and which partners can credibly satisfy due diligence expectations. In other words, fragmentation increases the interdependence between regulation and strategy.

It also redistributes competitive advantage. Firms with weak architectures incur translation costs, delayed decisions, duplicated monitoring, conflicting local practices, and avoidable legitimacy gaps. Firms with strong architectures can reconfigure supply chains faster, anticipate regulatory convergence, reassure stakeholders, and preserve optionality across markets. The strategic significance of compliance therefore rises as regulatory fragmentation deepens.

This article defines compliance architecture as the integrated organizational system through which a firm senses regulatory developments, translates heterogeneous rules into operational choices, orchestrates responses across internal and external actors, verifies conformity, and purposefully aligns governance choices with strategic priorities. The term architecture is deliberate. It highlights that the relevant object is not one department or one process, but the arrangement of structures, routines, interfaces, responsibilities, technologies, and escalation pathways that make coordinated adaptation possible.

Compliance architecture differs from routine compliance in three ways. First, it is cross-functional rather than legally siloed; it links legal teams with procurement, government affairs, sustainability, digital infrastructure, product design, internal audit, and top management. Second, it is forward-looking rather than purely reactive; it anticipates how rule changes may alter future market configurations. Third, it is selective and strategic rather than universalistic; it does not seek maximal compliance everywhere at any cost, but rather matches organizational form to the firm's portfolio, exposure, and legitimacy objectives.

The first microfoundation is sensing. Firms must monitor not only formal legislation but also consultation drafts, enforcement patterns, political narratives, NGO campaigns, court decisions, and standard-setting initiatives. Sensing therefore extends beyond legal scanning into geopolitical interpretation and issue prioritization. This claim resonates with work on international business diplomacy and techno-geopolitical uncertainty, both of which emphasize that firms need upstream awareness of institutional shifts rather than downstream legal interpretation alone (Doh et al., 2022; Luo & Van Assche, 2023).

The second microfoundation is translation. Fragmented rules must be converted into operationally meaningful decisions. Translation involves deciding what counts as acceptable evidence, which supplier tiers require traceability, what product redesign is necessary, how data should be stored, which internal systems must be segregated, and how business-unit incentives should change. Translation is not clerical. It is an exercise in organizational interpretation under ambiguity, and it determines whether the firm responds consistently or produces contradictory local adaptations.

The third microfoundation is orchestration. Because fragmented regulation spans multiple governance levels and issue domains, no single unit can respond effectively in isolation. Orchestration connects headquarters and subsidiaries, legal and commercial units, compliance officers and diplomats, internal systems and external partners. It also extends into the ecosystem of auditors, certifiers, law firms, trade associations, and key suppliers. The insight here parallels transnational governance scholarship: performance depends not only on rule content but on how actors interact across governance sites (Eberlein et al., 2014; Coche et al., 2024).

The fourth microfoundation is modularity. Firms operating under fragmented regulation need the capacity to partition activities, products, data flows, supplier sets, and governance protocols so that exposure in one domain does not contaminate the entire organization. Modularity does not imply autarky; it implies designed separability. It allows firms to localize sensitive activities, build alternative supplier networks, run differentiated compliance protocols, and preserve strategic flexibility without a full retreat from globalization. This is where compliance architecture overlaps with the reconfiguration logic of dynamic capabilities (Teece, 2007; Zahra et al., 2022).

A fifth, cross-cutting element is legitimacy management. Compliance architecture creates value not only by preventing penalties, but also by making the firm legible and credible to regulators, investors, civil society actors, and major customers. In this sense, compliance architecture is deeply connected to international business diplomacy and stakeholder management. Firms that can

document, explain, and defend their choices are better positioned to influence the evolution of standards rather than simply absorb them (Henisz, 2014; Doh et al., 2022).

The practical demands of these microfoundations differ by policy domain. Export controls tend to place pressure on end-use verification, customer screening, and technical classification. Supply-chain due diligence rules place pressure on traceability, supplier onboarding, audit design, and remediation protocols. Data governance rules place pressure on systems architecture, localization choices, and access controls. Carbon and sustainability disclosure rules place pressure on data integration, supplier reporting, and assurance quality. Looking across these domains makes the central argument more concrete: what firms need is not a larger legal department per se, but an architecture capable of translating heterogeneous rule logics into coherent operating decisions.

Table 2. Regulatory domains and the organizational demands they place on compliance architecture

Regulatory domain	What the firm must know	What the firm must do	Architectural pressure point
Export controls and sanctions	Technical classification, end use, customer identity, ownership links	Screen counterparties, classify products, manage licenses, separate sensitive activities	Sensing and modularity
Supply-chain due diligence	Supplier-tier conditions, labor and sourcing risks, remediation capacity	Map supplier tiers, collect evidence, audit, remediate, document decisions	Translation and orchestration
Data governance and cybersecurity	Data location, transfer pathways, access rights, infrastructure dependencies	Localize or segment systems, control access, redesign workflows, manage data transfer	Modularity and translation
Carbon and sustainability disclosure	Product-level emissions, supplier reporting, assurance readiness	Integrate data systems, build disclosure routines, verify supplier inputs	Orchestration and legitimacy management

Cross-domain comparison also reveals a problem that firm practice often hides. Regulatory domains rarely fail one at a time. A company redesigning its data architecture for privacy or cybersecurity reasons may inadvertently complicate emissions reporting, supplier traceability, or sanctions screening because the relevant data no longer sit in the same systems. Similarly, a localization strategy adopted to satisfy one government's digital rules may weaken visibility over suppliers or counterparties in another jurisdiction. This is why fragmented regulation is such a difficult managerial object. The challenge does not lie only in the severity of each individual rule, but in the way rule systems intersect inside the firm.

Those intersections can create what might be called second-order compliance problems. First-order problems arise when a firm must meet a specific rule. Second-order problems arise when meeting one rule changes the firm's capacity to meet other rules efficiently and credibly. A firm may satisfy local data-transfer requirements by segregating systems, but in doing so make group-wide audit trails slower and less reliable. It may reduce sanctions exposure by shrinking certain commercial relationships, but thereby become more dependent on a narrower supplier pool that raises due diligence risk elsewhere. Strong compliance architecture is valuable precisely because it helps management see these interactions earlier, before they harden into costly organizational contradictions.

This point also helps distinguish architecture from ordinary rule-following. Rule-following can be local and bounded. Architecture has to be systemic. It requires the firm to ask not only, "Can we comply with this rule?" but also, "What will compliance here do to our ability to comply elsewhere, and what does that imply for the overall shape of the business?" That broader question is where compliance begins to merge with strategy.



Figure 2. Compliance architecture as the firm-level capability that converts fragmented regulation into strategic outcomes.

The framework implies that compliance becomes strategic when these microfoundations reinforce one another. Sensing without translation produces awareness without action. Translation without orchestration creates local inconsistency. Orchestration without modularity generates bureaucracy without flexibility. And all four without legitimacy work fail to produce external trust. Compliance architecture is therefore best understood as a configurational capability rather than a checklist.

It is also useful to clarify what compliance architecture is not. It is not identical to legal risk management, because legal risk management can remain narrow, case-based, and downstream. It is not identical to nonmarket strategy, because nonmarket strategy often emphasizes influence over external stakeholders rather than the internal design needed to support credible execution. It is not identical to resilience, because resilience is usually treated as an outcome or broad organizational trait, whereas compliance architecture is one specific pathway through which resilience can be built or lost. And it is not synonymous with digital compliance tooling, because technology can support an architecture without substituting for judgment, accountability, and escalation routines.

This distinction helps explain why many firms still struggle even after substantial compliance investment. They may buy screening tools, hire specialized counsel, or create new reporting obligations, yet still lack a coherent architecture. The result is familiar: local units collect evidence that headquarters cannot compare; commercial teams escalate too late; sustainability and trade compliance operate on separate systems; data teams solve for cyber risk but not cross-border transfer legality; and government affairs understands the politics of a rule without knowing whether the organization can actually comply at scale. The value of the architecture concept is that it brings these failures into a single frame.

4. Typology, Propositions, and Research Agenda

Firms differ substantially in how they organize for fragmented regulation. Two dimensions are particularly useful for theorization: the degree of external regulatory fragmentation the firm faces, and the level of internal compliance orchestration capability it possesses. Crossing these dimensions yields four ideal types.

The first is minimalist compliance. Here, fragmentation is relatively low and the firm's internal coordination capability is limited. Compliance remains narrow, local, and largely reactive. This posture may be efficient in stable environments, but it is vulnerable when regulation suddenly becomes layered or extraterritorial.

The second is localized patchwork. In this quadrant, fragmentation is high but orchestration capability remains low. Subsidiaries, country managers, and external advisors improvise local responses, often producing duplication, inconsistency, and hidden vulnerabilities. Localized patchwork can create the illusion of flexibility, yet it frequently leads to legitimacy drift because the firm cannot explain or audit how different pieces fit together.

The third is the standardized compliance factory. Here, firms possess strong internal coordination but face relatively lower fragmentation. They centralize policies, automate controls, and scale standardized procedures. This posture can be efficient, but it may overemphasize uniformity and underestimate local political nuance.

The fourth is strategic compliance architecture. In this quadrant, firms face high fragmentation and respond with high orchestration capability. They integrate compliance with diplomacy, supply-chain governance, scenario planning, and portfolio strategy. They build modular responses where necessary, centralize interpretation where useful, and treat compliance not only as defense but as a basis for strategic flexibility. This is the posture most likely to preserve access to high-standard markets while sustaining adaptive capacity.



Figure 3. A typology of compliance postures under different levels of regulatory fragmentation and internal orchestration capability.

The typology also suggests movement paths. Firms often transition from minimalist compliance to localized patchwork when their external exposure intensifies faster than their organizational development. The more consequential transition is from patchwork to strategic architecture. That shift requires more than budget increases; it demands redesign of information flows, decision rights, board oversight, and interfaces between legal, policy, and operational teams.

The movement paths are unlikely to be linear. Some firms will build stronger architecture only after a public failure, a blocked shipment, a supplier scandal, or a regulator's warning letter. Others will move earlier because they operate in sectors where the downside of delay is obvious. This suggests that future research should pay attention to triggering events. Architecture may not emerge through steady optimization; it may emerge through punctuated change, when a shock reveals that a collection of local fixes is no longer enough.

The typology also has a comparative advantage over broad resilience labels. Calling a firm "resilient" often obscures the organizational trade-offs that produced that condition. By contrast, the compliance-posture typology keeps attention on how firms are organized. Two firms may both preserve market access during a regulatory shock, yet one may do so through a brittle and expensive patchwork while another does so through a more transferable architecture. Those differences matter for both theory and practice.

There is also a political economy angle. Localized patchwork is often sustained because it accommodates internal power structures. Country managers preserve autonomy, technical teams defend their own systems, and headquarters postpones difficult integration decisions as long as no major incident forces the issue. Strategic compliance architecture, by contrast, usually requires redistributing authority, standardizing certain forms of evidence, and making some local exceptions harder to justify. That means the move toward stronger architecture is not simply a technical upgrade. It is often an internal political project.

The conceptual framework supports a set of propositions for future work. These propositions are framed to guide both qualitative and mixed-method inquiry, though they may also inform later empirical research.

Proposition 1. As jurisdictional multiplicity, rule overlap, and enforcement asymmetry increase, compliance becomes more tightly coupled with core strategic choices concerning market participation, supply-chain design, data architecture, and partner selection.

The intuition is that fragmented regulation changes the scope of what compliance governs. The firm is no longer deciding only whether it meets a rule, but whether the business model through which it creates value remains governable under multiple rules at once. This proposition links international business policy directly to organizational design.

Proposition 2. The negative performance effects of fragmented regulation are mediated by translation costs and coordination delays rather than by rule quantity alone.

This proposition matters because not all regulation is equally harmful. A large number of rules may be manageable if they are coherent, well understood, and auditable. By contrast, a smaller set of conflicting rules can impose disproportionate costs if the firm lacks the architecture needed to interpret and align them. The central mechanism is organizational friction, not regulatory abundance per se.

Proposition 3. Firms with stronger sensing, translation, orchestration, and modularity capabilities will experience fragmented regulation less as a constraint and more as a source of differentiated strategic flexibility.

This is the core capability claim. Strong compliance architecture does not eliminate regulation; it changes the firm's response set. Such firms can reconfigure portfolios, localize selectively, maintain evidentiary credibility, and move faster than competitors when the policy environment shifts.

Proposition 4. The strategic value of compliance architecture increases when it is integrated with international business diplomacy and stakeholder engagement rather than managed as a purely legal-control function.

Public and private governance now interact continuously. Firms therefore need architectures that communicate outward as well as control inward. Integration with diplomacy matters because rule interpretation, enforcement discretion, and legitimacy assessments are shaped through relationships with regulators, industry bodies, investors, and civil society actors (Henisz, 2014; Doh et al., 2022).

Proposition 5. Under high reputational salience and extraterritorial enforcement, firms organized around localized patchwork will be more prone to legitimacy drift than firms organized around strategic compliance architecture.

Legitimacy drift occurs when the firm's local adaptations become difficult to reconcile into a coherent organizational narrative. This creates exposure not only to formal penalties but also to

activist escalation, customer distrust, and internal confusion. Patchwork responses often fail because they solve for local legality while weakening global credibility.

Proposition 6. Strategic compliance architecture generates positive competitive outcomes beyond risk reduction, including superior market access, faster reconfiguration, stronger partner screening, and enhanced influence over emerging standards.

This final proposition shifts the conversation from downside protection to competitive positioning. In fragmented environments, high-capability firms may help shape what becomes administratively feasible or commercially legitimate for others. The architecture itself becomes a firm-specific advantage.

These propositions open a broad research agenda. A first avenue concerns measurement. Future studies should move beyond binary compliance variables and instead examine architecture dimensions such as governance centralization, evidence systems, cross-functional integration, escalation speed, and the use of modular operating designs. Useful indicators might include the existence of cross-functional risk committees, the degree of shared compliance-data infrastructure, the speed of issue escalation from subsidiaries to headquarters, the extent of supplier-tier visibility, and the presence of modular policy playbooks for different jurisdictions. Those choices would allow researchers to compare architectures without collapsing everything into simple counts of laws or violations.

A second avenue concerns boundary conditions. The value of compliance architecture is likely to vary by industry sensitivity, supply-chain depth, dependence on strategic inputs, and exposure to high-salience stakeholders. Firms operating in semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, cloud services, defense-adjacent electronics, and critical minerals are likely to face more acute trade-offs than firms in less regulated sectors. The same is true for companies whose products are deeply embedded in public procurement, health systems, or nationally sensitive infrastructure. A theory that ignores those differences will miss a large part of the variance in how firms experience regulatory fragmentation.

A third avenue concerns organizational trade-offs. Better architecture is not free. Some firms may become too centralized and burden local units with rigid procedures that slow commercial decisions. Others may invest heavily in auditable evidence systems but underinvest in relationship-based diplomacy. Still others may over-localize operations in response to regulation and unintentionally sacrifice economies of scale or organizational learning. Future work should therefore not assume that more compliance architecture is always better. The question is whether the architecture fits the firm's exposure profile and strategic objectives.

A fourth avenue concerns research design. Comparative case studies would be particularly useful for tracing how firms in the same industry confront the same regulatory shock but build different internal responses. Process-based work could examine how specific functions, such as trade compliance, cybersecurity, sustainability, government affairs, and procurement, are stitched together after a major policy event. Survey-based work could map architecture dimensions across multinational firms, while archival research might proxy them through board structures, disclosure practices, third-party assurance, or the internal distribution of compliance responsibilities. A more ambitious agenda could combine interviews with regulatory event histories to show how architecture evolves after shocks rather than existing fully formed in advance.

A fifth avenue concerns co-evolution. Firms do not only adapt to fragmented regulation; they can contribute to stabilizing or amplifying it through lobbying, standard-setting, supplier mandates, and voluntary disclosure. That matters because high-capability firms may shape the competitive rules of the game in ways that raise barriers for smaller firms and suppliers. A sixth avenue concerns distributional consequences. Strong architectures may improve resilience for lead firms while shifting monitoring costs, documentation burdens, and liability exposure onto lower-tier partners, especially in developing economies. That possibility deserves more attention from both business scholars and policymakers.

A final avenue concerns scope conditions and failure modes. The framework is least likely to travel cleanly to firms whose international exposure is shallow, whose products are weakly regulated, and whose value creation does not depend on complex cross-border coordination. In those settings, a lean compliance structure may be entirely adequate. By contrast, the framework should matter most where firms operate across multiple regulatory blocs, depend on sensitive technologies or inputs, and need to demonstrate conformity to public and private audiences at the same time. Future work should test those limits rather than assuming a universal shift toward architecture.

Failure modes deserve special attention because they sharpen the theory. One obvious failure mode is overbuilding. Firms may respond to fragmentation by creating such dense control systems that they slow commercial decision making, alienate local managers, and drive workarounds underground. Another is symbolic architecture, where firms create governance committees, dashboards, and assurance language that signal seriousness without solving underlying translation problems. A third is selective blindness, where the architecture works well for the domains most visible to headquarters but remains weak in less salient geographies or lower supplier tiers. These are not side issues. They indicate when compliance architecture becomes performative rather than strategic.

Making room for failure improves the explanatory power of the framework. If all investment in compliance architecture were assumed to improve outcomes, the concept would collapse into a simple call for more controls. The stronger claim is narrower and more defensible: architecture adds value when it creates usable coordination across domains, jurisdictions, and functions without producing paralyzing rigidity. That is an empirical and organizational question, not a rhetorical one, and future research should treat it as such.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

The framework has direct managerial implications. Senior executives should resist treating compliance as a late-stage approval gate. In fragmented environments, that model is too slow and too narrow. Compliance architecture should be designed at the level of enterprise governance, with explicit interfaces to government affairs, procurement, sustainability, data governance, and strategy. In practical terms, this means elevating decision rights, clarifying escalation pathways, investing in traceability and evidence systems, and linking compliance intelligence to portfolio review.

One practical implication is sequencing. Firms rarely have the time or budget to redesign everything at once. A sensible starting point is to identify the few regulatory domains where business interruption would be most costly, then audit how information currently travels from the point of rule detection to the point of operating response. In many firms, the weakest links are not legal interpretation itself but fragmented data ownership, unclear accountability for supplier evidence, and slow escalation across headquarters-subsidiary interfaces. Those are architecture problems, not simply staffing problems.

Managers should also distinguish between standardization and architecture. Standardization is useful where obligations are stable and repeatable. Architecture becomes necessary where obligations are overlapping, contested, and politically volatile. Firms that over-centralize may become rigid; firms that under-coordinate may become incoherent. The strategic task is therefore one of selective centralization combined with modular adaptation.

Another implication concerns board oversight. Boards often review compliance through the language of risk and misconduct, while strategy discussions occur elsewhere. That separation is increasingly unhelpful. Where regulatory fragmentation shapes market access and partner eligibility, the board needs visibility not only into incidents but also into architecture quality: which domains are auditable, where evidence remains weak, which jurisdictions create unresolved conflicts, and where the organization lacks fallback options if policy conditions worsen.

The framework also speaks to policymakers. If governments want firms to implement public goals effectively, they should recognize that regulatory fragmentation creates substantial translation and coordination burdens. Poorly aligned rules can generate wasteful duplication and encourage

symbolic compliance rather than substantive change. Better intergovernmental coordination and clearer guidance can therefore improve not only firm compliance rates but also policy effectiveness.

More concretely, policymakers can reduce unnecessary friction in at least four ways. First, they can improve definitional interoperability across adjacent regulatory regimes. Firms often face overlapping obligations that use similar language, for example around due diligence, beneficial ownership, or high-risk suppliers, but define those terms differently. That raises compliance costs without necessarily improving public outcomes. Second, regulators can provide clearer evidentiary expectations. Many firms can adapt to demanding rules if they know what kinds of documentation, traceability, and assurance will be viewed as credible. Ambiguity about evidence often creates more disruption than stringency itself.

Third, policymakers can sequence implementation more realistically. A recurring problem in supply-chain and sustainability regulation is that firms are given broad accountability for lower-tier networks that are not yet sufficiently visible or auditable. In those settings, phased compliance, safe-harbor provisions tied to credible remediation efforts, and more realistic timelines may improve substantive compliance more than immediate maximal obligations. Fourth, governments can invest in cooperative infrastructures, such as customs interoperability, digital reporting standards, and mutual recognition arrangements, that lower translation burdens while preserving regulatory objectives.

These suggestions do not imply deregulation. They imply better regulation. Fragmented systems frequently shift resources away from solving the underlying public problem and toward proving to multiple audiences that a process exists. When that happens, firms respond rationally by optimizing for audit survival rather than operational change. A policy lens on compliance architecture therefore has a broader lesson: if states increasingly govern through firms, then the organizational feasibility of implementation should become part of policy design from the beginning rather than an afterthought.

Policymakers also face a more uncomfortable trade-off. Rules that rely heavily on firm-level compliance systems may advantage large firms with the resources to build architecture while disadvantaging smaller firms and suppliers that cannot absorb the same monitoring costs. That may be acceptable in some high-risk domains, but it should be recognized rather than ignored. A regime that formally raises standards but practically concentrates market power deserves closer scrutiny. One reason this article emphasizes architecture is that it makes those distributive effects easier to see.

There is a parallel implication for cross-border regulatory cooperation. Governments often seek policy autonomy, especially in areas tied to national security, labor rights, or digital sovereignty. Yet complete autonomy at the rule-design stage can produce heavy duplication at the implementation stage. The challenge is not to eliminate policy diversity, which is unrealistic, but to identify which parts of the regulatory stack genuinely require national divergence and which parts could be aligned without sacrificing substantive goals. From a policy perspective, the quality of international business regulation increasingly depends on getting that balance right.

Finally, the article has implications for debates on industrial policy and economic security. States increasingly rely on firms to implement public objectives through supply chains, technology governance, and due diligence systems. This delegation means that private organizational capabilities are now part of public policy capacity. Policymakers should therefore care not only about what rules say, but also about whether firms can build architectures capable of carrying them out coherently.

This article has argued that fragmented global regulation changes the nature of competition in the world economy. As public policies, private standards, and geopolitical pressures become more layered and extraterritorial, compliance can no longer be treated as a peripheral legal safeguard. It becomes an organizational architecture through which firms govern exposure, preserve legitimacy, and sustain strategic flexibility.

By integrating insights from international business policy, nonmarket strategy, institutional complexity, transnational governance, and dynamic capabilities, the article develops a conceptual framework for understanding compliance architecture as strategy. The central claim is not that regulation disappears, nor that firms can fully control it. Rather, firms differ in how effectively they organize to interpret, absorb, shape, and strategically deploy regulatory demands. In a fragmented global economy, that difference increasingly matters.

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